I’m a consequentialist libertarian—in short, libertarian institutions are justified in virtue of producing good consequences. I also support some form of state-enforced cash transfers like a negative income tax or a universal basic income.
1. You argue (correctly, as far as it goes) that [complying with] negative rights can be costly, telling the story of Frank needing a blood transfusion but still needing Beth’s consent to save his life with her blood. The implication I assume is that sometimes that cost can become too high, allowing us to override such negative rights.
Yet a paragraph or so above, arguing against unchosen duties, you note “you’re obligated to respect someone’s right of bodily autonomy…” So it sounds like the lawyer arguing “My client didn’t commit the murder and in the alternative if he did it was in self-defense.” 😁
2. Clearly pure consequentialism on positive rights, at least of a utilitarian sort, would seem to save Thompson’s violinist, and on that basis maybe even provide a libertarian argument against abortion.
3. I’ve always thought one of the strongest arguments favoring negative rights and opposing positive rights involves the need for rights to be compossible. Granted it’s only a blog post but there’s no mention of that issue here. I’m sure you have thoughts regarding that and hope eventually you’ll write something on it.
Another way to frame it is that positive rights violate the compossibility criterion. There can't (logically) be a right to violate rights. So if you think there is a negative right to life and liberty, that's why there aren't positive rights (except via consensual arrangements). It's not about whether respecting Beth's rights imposes costs to Frank, it's that Frank has no right to Beth's body.
Generally, the law does not enforce a duty to save strangers from danger. The archetypical example is encountering a baby drowning in a pool of rainwater. Do you think your barista or the state should have legal recourse against the phone-holding refuser?
The idea that there can be a duty to do nothing seems strange to me as person sympathetic with libertarian deontology. I don't think deontological libertarians are picturing the "duty" to respect other people's bodily autonomy. I think they're picturing default positions based on consent.
A duty to a deontological libertarian is something that is taken on voluntarily and then cannot be removed because others have relied on it.
It seems bizarre to think that people have a constant duty to do nothing in deontological libertarianism. I don't think that's the case.
Where does consent fit in with a consequentialist version of duty? It seems kind of irrelevant to the consequentialist but it's at the core of duties in libertarianism.
Arguments for positive rights in context of state enforcement necessarily disregards the Non Aggression Principle (NAP), which is generally accepted as the foundation of libertarianism.
Doing so makes one a utilitarian, libertarian sympathies notwithstanding.
One cannot be a state-enforced, positive rights libertarian. It is a contradiction of terms and principles.
The only area a libertarian may principally argue for positive rights are in voluntarist contexts, such as moral, religious, or non-legal civic duties.
Nice blog piece.
Some scattered thoughts:
1. You argue (correctly, as far as it goes) that [complying with] negative rights can be costly, telling the story of Frank needing a blood transfusion but still needing Beth’s consent to save his life with her blood. The implication I assume is that sometimes that cost can become too high, allowing us to override such negative rights.
Yet a paragraph or so above, arguing against unchosen duties, you note “you’re obligated to respect someone’s right of bodily autonomy…” So it sounds like the lawyer arguing “My client didn’t commit the murder and in the alternative if he did it was in self-defense.” 😁
2. Clearly pure consequentialism on positive rights, at least of a utilitarian sort, would seem to save Thompson’s violinist, and on that basis maybe even provide a libertarian argument against abortion.
3. I’ve always thought one of the strongest arguments favoring negative rights and opposing positive rights involves the need for rights to be compossible. Granted it’s only a blog post but there’s no mention of that issue here. I’m sure you have thoughts regarding that and hope eventually you’ll write something on it.
Another way to frame it is that positive rights violate the compossibility criterion. There can't (logically) be a right to violate rights. So if you think there is a negative right to life and liberty, that's why there aren't positive rights (except via consensual arrangements). It's not about whether respecting Beth's rights imposes costs to Frank, it's that Frank has no right to Beth's body.
Generally, the law does not enforce a duty to save strangers from danger. The archetypical example is encountering a baby drowning in a pool of rainwater. Do you think your barista or the state should have legal recourse against the phone-holding refuser?
Interesting piece! I'd love to hear your thoughts on Smithian Justice. Dan Klein outlines the different types of justice in this paper: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2930837
The idea that there can be a duty to do nothing seems strange to me as person sympathetic with libertarian deontology. I don't think deontological libertarians are picturing the "duty" to respect other people's bodily autonomy. I think they're picturing default positions based on consent.
A duty to a deontological libertarian is something that is taken on voluntarily and then cannot be removed because others have relied on it.
It seems bizarre to think that people have a constant duty to do nothing in deontological libertarianism. I don't think that's the case.
Where does consent fit in with a consequentialist version of duty? It seems kind of irrelevant to the consequentialist but it's at the core of duties in libertarianism.
Arguments for positive rights in context of state enforcement necessarily disregards the Non Aggression Principle (NAP), which is generally accepted as the foundation of libertarianism.
Doing so makes one a utilitarian, libertarian sympathies notwithstanding.
One cannot be a state-enforced, positive rights libertarian. It is a contradiction of terms and principles.
The only area a libertarian may principally argue for positive rights are in voluntarist contexts, such as moral, religious, or non-legal civic duties.
You can generally find it in most Marxist/socialist literature.