Libertarianism Isn't Really About Liberty (And That's OK)
Socialists argue that libertarianism isn’t really about freedom. For instance, someone without good options is, in a meaningful sense, not free to reject a bad job offer.
Fair enough. But (deontological) libertarianism is better understood as a view about enforceable duties. Think of it this way. You do not have an enforceable duty to offer *any* job to someone without good options. That is, the state may not compel you to offer that person a job. It would be strange, then, to claim that you have an enforceable duty to not offer a *bad* job to that person—an offer that they can reject and be no worse off compared to a situation where they had no offer. (See this discussion of the “non-worseness claim” for more.)
Regardless of whether we want to say that the person is not free in some important sense to reject that offer doesn’t really get at the heart of the matter. The real issue is whether the state should coercively prevent the offer or acceptance of the bad job.
The libertarian position is that it should not. If you are permitted to offer no job, you should be permitted to offer a low-wage job.
Do deontological libertarians in your view make some mistake other than just not accepting consequentialism? Are there unique or specific problems with accepting a deontological version of libertarianism?
Non-libertarians often seem to have a "Copenhagen" interpretation of ethics:
https://entitledtoanopinion.wordpress.com/2015/07/17/you-said-it-better-than-my-years-of-attempts/
By having an interaction (such as offering any kind of job), you thereby acquire the blame for their pre-existing poor prospects.