Liberals and libertarians agree that the state ought to prioritize the protection of civil liberties such as freedom of association, freedom of religious practice, freedom of speech, and so on. But they disagree about the status of property. Rawls, for instance, recognizes that citizens do need some right to own property “to allow a sufficient material basis for a sense of personal independence and self-respect” (Political Liberalism, 298). The justification of property rights is the same as the justification of any other kind of liberal right—it’s needed to choose and pursue your own way of life. In brief, it’s hard to choose and pursue your own way of life without the freedom to, for instance, make your own decisions about buying and selling books, electronics, appliances, transportation, food, housing, clothing, entertainment, and so on.
The difference is that libertarians endorse a much stronger right to property than liberals. However, I’ll argue that the reasons that liberals tend to offer on behalf of limiting property rights also provide justification for limiting other rights that they don’t want to limit. So they face a dilemma: either consistently limit other liberal rights and avoid libertarianism or reject the relevant limits on property rights and embrace libertarianism.
Consider some of the most common liberal objections to a libertarian account of property rights:
(1) Respect for libertarian property rights prohibits the state from redistributing from the rich to the poor even when the redistribution would prevent extremely bad outcomes for the poor such as severe poverty or even death.
Setting aside the empirical question of how effectively state redistribution actually prevents bad outcomes for the poor, I’ll note that respect for other liberal rights can also prevent the state from taking action to prevent extremely bad outcomes for those in need. The right of bodily autonomy prohibits the state from institutionalizing compulsory blood draws even in the event that they’re needed to prevent a catastrophic blood shortage. The right of occupational choice prohibits the state from coercing a brilliant heart surgeon into delaying her retirement even though doing so could save the lives of dozens of patients. Lastly, consider that many liberals reject Bad Samaritan laws that impose an enforceable duty of easy rescue, such as one compelling bystanders to call 911 in the event of an emergency. But the rejection of this sort of law suggests that the state may not compel you to use your property to provide help to someone in need.
(2) People don’t need expansive libertarian-style property rights to develop and exercise their capacity for justice and to pursue their conception of the good life to an adequate extent.
This is an objection from Rawls. The idea here is that while you need some freedom to use your property as you see fit, you don’t need as much freedom as the libertarian would give you. The state shouldn’t stop you from expanding your deck, but perhaps you’ll get along fine if it sets some limits on your multinational corporation.
The problem with this objection is that it undermines other liberal rights as well. You’ll get along fine if, for instance, the state restricts your right to chat about the NFL playoffs between 2:00-3:00AM or prevents you from hanging out with your old college buddy for more than eight hours on the first of every February. Still, you have the right to do these things in virtue of your right to freedom of speech and freedom of association. So, as a general rule, the state may not limit a freedom simply on the grounds that it deems it inessential.
(3) Unrestricted libertarian property rights will create unjust political inequalities.
If the state does not set limits on a person’s right to use their property to influence political outcomes, then the rich will gain an unfair amount of political power via their political spending.
As a first reply, I’ll note that the line between speech and the use of property is probably blurrier than it seems. Plausibly, a state-imposed ban on buying a Che Guevara shirt or posting a sign with the name of your favorite candidate in your front yard would involve a restriction on your speech even though in some technical sense it merely restricts how you use your property. But this point suggests that we may use our property to promote a particular political outcome.
Of course, the impact of a yard sign on political outcomes is pretty small. Still, respecting freedom of speech can mean allowing substantial inequalities in political influence. For instance, Oprah Winfrey’s 2008 endorsement resulted in about one million votes for Obama. A celebrity endorsement of a candidate has far more power to influence the outcome than, say, my endorsement. Nevertheless, liberals committed to respecting people’s speech rights may not restrict these endorsements in the name of securing equal political influence. So at first blush at least, it’s unclear why they may restrict people’s property rights in the name of securing equal political influence.
One big difference is that the use of property by one person may non-contractually limit the liberty of use of property by another. The emitter of CO2 did not purchase the right to harm those that are harmed. Taxing an externality sort of get around this by limiting the amount of harm but by itself does not completer the "transaction" by paying out the proceeds to victim.
Speech/worship does not have the same "externality"